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ABSTRACT
Freedom of information acts (FOIA) aim to improve the public’s oppor-
tunities to access official information from public authorities and hence 
to increase the level of transparency. Thus, it is important to know 
whether and to what degree the effects intended by establishing FOIAs 
are achieved and how their implementation could be improved. Hence, 
this article presents the evaluation of the Hamburg Transparency Law 
(HmbTG) – Germany’s first FOIA that binds authorities to disclose govern-
ment information proactively. The purpose of the paper is to provide a 
valuable example of how evaluating FOIA might produce useful informa-
tion for policymakers and public authorities. The analysis results, based 
on a mixed set of methods (i.e. standardised surveys, statistical secondary 
data, qualitative expert interviews, and criteria-driven document analy-
sis), lead to the conclusion that the HmbTG was very effective in provid-
ing the direct access. On the other hand, it was found that strategies for 
implementing the law varied considerably between authorities, yet pro-
active disclosure was overall implemented effectively. Moreover, this law 
shows some weaknesses to be improved in the future. Besides provid-
ing practitioners with valuable insights into how a transparency law may 
be implemented, the evaluation of the HmbTG also provides researchers 
with ideas how FOIA evaluation might be conducted comprehensively.
Keywords: access to information, proactive transparency, FOIA, Hamburg transpar-
ency law, evaluation
JEL: K23
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1 Introduction 
Providing the public with open access to official information by means of free-
dom of information (FOI) laws – also referred to as transparency laws – is often 
considered to be a well suited approach for decreasing public sector corrup-
tion, improving governance, increasing bureaucratic efficiency and account-
ability, constraining politicians, or empowering citizens and journalists (e.g., 
Vadlamannati and Cooray, 2016; Berliner, 2010; Escaleras, Lin, and Register, 
2010; Worthy, 2010; Piotrowski and Rosenbloom, 2002). Therefore it is not 
surprising that many countries have already passed FOI laws in order to “insti-
tutionalize transparency by creating legal guarantees of the right to request 
government information” (Berliner, 2010, p. 479). A common feature of all FOI 
laws is that they are supposed to increase the level of transparency by improv-
ing the public’s opportunities to access government information from public 
authorities. Yet there are also substantial differences concerning the details 
of FOI legislation. For example, most FOI laws only cover the public’s right 
to access government information by filing a request, while only a minority 
require the authorities to disclose official information proactively. Transpar-
ency laws also differ with regard to aspects of enforcement, ease of access, 
coverage, and exemptions (e.g., Ackerman and Sandoval-Ballesteros, 2006).
Regardless of the contents and formulation of FOI laws, for the public and for 
policymakers it is crucial to know whether the effects intended by establishing 
a transparency law are achieved. Although previous research has already in-
vestigated potential effects with regard to public sector corruption (e.g., Cuc-
ciniello, Porumbescu, and Grimmelikhuijsen, 2018; Bauhr and Grimes, 2014; 
Escaleras et al., 2010; Lindstedt and Naurin, 2010), governance (e.g., Cucciniel-
lo et al., 2018; Islam, 2006), accountability (e.g., Cucciniello et al., 2018; Riddell, 
2013), bureaucratic efficiency (e.g., Cucciniello et al., 2018; Vadlamannati and 
Cooray, 2016), perceived transparency (e.g., Worthy, 2010; Relly and Sabhar-
wal, 2009), perceived government performance (e.g., Porumbescu, 2017a), 
and trust in government (e.g., Cucciniello et al., 2018; Porumbescu, 2017b; 
Grimmelikhuijsen et al., 2013; Worthy, 2010), most of these studies involved 
cross-national comparisons for assessing the effects of transparency laws. 
Yet comparing transparency laws between countries can be problematic be-
cause of “differences from one country to another, including varying political 
systems, disclosure procedures, and measures of public use and awareness” 
(Michener, 2011, p. 149). Thus, cross-national comparisons are not well suited 
to assessing the individual effects of a transparency law, and they do not pro-
vide policymakers or the public with specific knowledge about how the FOI 
legislation in a given country could be adjusted and improved.
A fair assessment of a country’s FOI legislation needs to take into account the 
individual formulation of the transparency law as well as its implementation 
– a unique and very country-specific process – which is crucial for its effective-
ness (Relly and Sabharwal, 2009; Islam, 2006). Therefore, the current state of 
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research calls for comprehensive evaluations of individual transparency laws 
at national or even federal state level. An FOI law evaluation which serves as a 
valuable example of how such an endeavour might produce useful information 
for policymakers and public authorities is the evaluation of the Hamburg Trans-
parency Law (HmbTG) from 2016 to 2017 (Herr et al., 2018b; see also Herr et 
al. 2017 for an on-line version of the final evaluation report). The evaluation 
was commissioned by the Hamburg Ministry of Justice and comprised various 
evaluation tasks, including the assessment of the effectiveness of the HmbTG 
and the quality of its implementation as well as an in-depth analysis of the le-
gal document itself. Besides providing practitioners with valuable insights into 
how a transparency law may be implemented in order to achieve its intended 
effects, the evaluation of the HmbTG also provides researchers with ideas 
about how an FOI law evaluation might be conducted in evaluation practice.
This article provides readers with a brief description of the contents of the 
HmbTG, the methodological approach of its evaluation, and the main find-
ings of the evaluation. Before that, however, the historical background of the 
HmbTG is briefly explicated.
2 The Hamburg Transparency Law
Germany is a federation, which is why FOI legislation has taken and still takes 
place at different levels and different speeds. It is crucial to differentiate be-
tween federal and federal state (‘Land’) level because each entity can only 
bind its own governmental bodies and administration. At the moment, Ger-
many ranks 12th in the 2017 Corruption Perceptions Index and 24th in the 
Global Open Data Index.
At federal level, FOI legislation started in 1994 when Germany implemented 
the Council Directive 90/313/EEC by passing the Environmental Information 
Act (UIG). The UIG guarantees access to environmental information without 
prerequisites such as stating a reason for the interest in the information re-
quested. Consequently, one might say that at federal level, German FOI leg-
islation was initiated by EU legislation (Mecklenburg and Pöppelmann, 2007, 
p. 16). In 1998, the Federal Ministry of the Interior drafted a federal FOI law, 
whose legislation took three legislative periods (the 14th, 15th, and 16th) (Meck-
lenburg and Pöppelmann, 2007, p. 15). In 2002, an alliance of representatives 
of journalist and civil rights organisations joined the discussion with their own 
draft (Mecklenburg and Pöppelmann, 2007, p. 15). The German Bundestag 
passed the Federal Act Governing Access to Information held by the Federal 
Government (IFG) at the end of 2005, and the IFG entered into force in 2006. 
Under the IFG, anyone is entitled to access official information from the au-
thorities of the Federal Government. The IFG only applies to federal bodies 
and contains an obligation to release government information after a request 
has been filed. Yet the IFG does not force the authorities bound by the law to 
disclose government information proactively.
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At Land level, FOI legislation is more diverse. Four Länder passed FOI laws 
several years before the Federation. The first was Brandenburg, whose FOI 
law dates back to 1998. It was followed by Berlin (1999), Schleswig-Holstein 
(2000) and North Rhine-Westphalia (2001). During the next two years, seven 
other Länder – Hamburg, Bremen, Mecklenburg-Western Pomerania, Saar-
land, Thuringia, Rhineland-Palatinate, and Saxony-Anhalt – followed. In 2018, 
Hesse included ten sections regulating the access to information upon re-
quest in its data protection law. Like the IFG, all these laws entitled every-
one to access official information from the authorities of the respective Land. 
All the applicant needs to do is request the information. In 2012, Hamburg 
replaced its Freedom of Information Act with the HmbTG. The HmbTG was 
the first FOI act in Germany that included an obligation on the authorities to 
disclose information proactively on line. By 2017, three other Länder – Rhine-
land-Palatinate, Bremen and Schleswig-Holstein – had revised their respective 
FOI laws and installed an obligation to disclose official information proactively 
too. Baden-Württemberg installed this obligation in its first FOI legislation in 
2015. Therefore, in the autumn of 2018, the landscape of German FOI legisla-
tion is still fragmented. Five Länder force their authorities to disclose informa-
tion proactively, eight Länder and the Federation give applicants the possibil-
ity to request information, whilst three Länder have not provided the public 
with access to official information by means of an FOI act so far.
2.1 Genesis of the HmbTG
In 2006, Hamburg’s parliament – the ‘Bürgerschaft’ – passed the Hamburg 
Freedom of Information Act (HmbIFG). Its core feature was the obligation on 
public authorities to release official information on request. Yet the HmbIFG 
was not the end of Hamburg’s efforts to make its administration transparent, 
because six years later, a more rigorous transparency law entered into force 
in an unusual manner.
As in many other Länder, in Hamburg it is possible to pass a law via referen-
dum. (See Article 50 of the Constitution of the Free and Hanseatic City of 
Hamburg). To initiate a referendum a people’s initiative has to collect 10,000 
signatures from citizens entitled to vote for the Bürgerschaft. Then the Bürg-
erschaft has to tackle the issue. If they do not make a positive decision on the 
matter, the people’s initiative can move on to a referendum and ultimately 
have the citizens pass the bill.
In 2011, the not-for-profit organisations Transparency International, Mehr 
Demokratie, and the Chaos Computer Club Hamburg founded the peo-
ple’s initiative ‘Transparenz schafft Vertrauen’ (‘transparency creates trust’) 
(Maatsch and Schnabel, 2015, p. 1). The initiative aimed to pass an FOI law 
containing an obligation to the proactive disclosure of information (Maatsch 
and Schnabel, 2015, p. 1) in order to impede corruption, prevent the waste of 
taxpayers’ money, reduce mistrust, strengthen trust in politics and the admin-
istration, simplify administrative processes, and facilitate co-determination 
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(Bürgerschaft der Freien und Hansestadt Hamburg, 2011, p. 5). They intended 
to overturn the system of FOI legislation by creating a central information 
register (Bürgerschaft der Freien und Hansestadt Hamburg, 2011, p. 5) in 
which official information had to be published. The citizens were to have the 
possibility to inform themselves before political decisions were made (Bürg-
erschaft der Freien und Hansestadt Hamburg, 2011, p. 6).
The initial draft of the bill of the people’s initiative was written with the help 
of an on-line tool (Humborg et al., 2012, p. 56). By the end of 2011, the initia-
tive had gathered the 10,000 necessary signatures (Maatsch and Schnabel, 
2015, p. 1). The Bürgerschaft discussed the draft in early 2012 and the peo-
ple’s initiative ‘Transparenz schafft Vertrauen’ revised it in order to make it 
the basis for a referendum (Maatsch and Schnabel, 2015, p. 1). This revised 
draft was the basis for the bill of the HmbTG made by all fractions of the 
Bürgerschaft (Kleindiek, 2013, p. 188). Unlike the initial draft of the people’s 
initiative ‘Transparenz schafft Vertrauen’, this draft was elaborated by only 
six to eight people (Kleindiek, 2013, p. 194). On 12 June 2012, the people’s 
initiative and all fractions of the Bürgerschaft held a press conference and an-
nounced that the bill of the HmbTG would be passed the next day (Maatsch 
and Schnabel, 2015, p. 1f.). It would not be an exaggeration to say that the 
legislative process was very high-speed, particularly towards the end (Maatsch 
and Schnabel, 2015, p. 2).
2.2 Content of the HmbTG
The HmbTG was the first FOI law in Germany that forces public authorities 
to disclose official information proactively. It is divided into four sections – 
the principle of transparency, information on request, the Hamburg Commis-
sioner for data protection and freedom of information (HmbBfDI), and final 
provisions. The principle of transparency consists of the Sections 1-10. This 
includes the purpose of the HmbTG, terms and definitions, the scope of ap-
plication, the protection of personal data, the exemptions, and the technical 
details of the obligation to proactive disclosure. The information on request 
is dealt with in three sections that regulate application, access to informa-
tion, and the procedure. The final provisions govern the relationship between 
the HmbTG and other FOI legislation, state treaties, treaties older than the 
HmbTG itself, and the evaluation.
With regard to the goals of the law, the HmbTG [in Section 1 (1)] first aims 
to facilitate the democratic formation of opinion and enable the monitoring 
of government action beyond the existing possibilities of information. To 
achieve this, information held by the authorities mentioned in Section 2 (3) 
HmbTG is to be made accessible to the general public. Nevertheless, the pro-
tection of personal data is guaranteed. The justification of the law adds that 
the proactive disclosure facilitates democratic opinion-making, enables the 
public to monitor the actions of the state and prevent corruption (Bürger-
schaft der Freien und Hansestadt Hamburg, 2012, p. 12). The HmbTG is fur-
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ther designed to support trust in the actions of politics and the administration 
(Bürgerschaft der Freien und Hansestadt Hamburg, 2012, p. 13). At the same 
time, the law is intended to raise cost awareness within the administration 
inasmuch as the possibility to raise questions creates pressure to justify the 
costs (Bürgerschaft der Freien und Hansestadt Hamburg, 2012, p. 13). Finally, 
Section 1 (2) HmbTG provides everyone with the right to direct access to in-
formation under the provisions of the HmbTG.
Section 2 HmbTG contains various definitions. These include the very impor-
tant terms ‘obligation to proactive disclosure’ and ‘obligation to provide infor-
mation upon request’. According to this section, all files – no matter in which 
form they are stored – are considered to be information. The information has 
to be published in a central, electronic, publically available register. Moreover, 
not only the public administration but also companies which perform public 
tasks (particularly public services) and are under the control of Hamburg have 
an obligation to proactive disclosure. In addition, direct and indirect public 
administration have to give access to information on request. Indirect public 
administration consists of legal entities under administrative law created by 
the state to fulfil the duties of the state.
Section 3 HmbTG governs the scope of application. The areas that come un-
der the obligation to proactive disclosure include public service contracts, 
budgets, administrative regulations, official statistics, studies carried out on 
behalf of the authority, geodata, the tree cadastres, urban land use plans and 
landscape plans, the main provisions of granted building permits, and subsi-
dies and grant awards [Section 3 (1) HmbTG]. Contracts whose publication 
is of public interest should be published as long as this does not negatively 
affect the economic interests of Hamburg [Section 3 (2) HmbTG]. All informa-
tion that falls under the obligation to proactive disclosure also falls under the 
obligation to provide information on request [Section 3 (3) HmbTG].
Sections 4-7 and Section 9 HmbTG deal with the exemptions. Exemptions 
are mainly made for personal data, some authorities, the protection of pub-
lic interest, and trade secrets. Section 4 HmbTG regulates the protection of 
personal data. This means a general obliteration of personal data as in Sec-
tion 4 (1) sentence 1 HmbTG. The remaining parts of Section 4 govern the 
exemptions from the non-disclosure of personal data. Section 5 HmbTG deals 
with exempted authorities. Among others, the courts and the Court of Audi-
tors (as long as they operate in judicial independence), the State Office for 
the Protection of the Constitution, matters of tax assessment and collection, 
and broadcasters are exempt from the information obligation. Furthermore, 
Section 6 HmbTG exempts some public interests. These include the decision-
making process of the Senate and draft decisions as well as protocols and 
consultations protected by special laws. In addition to Section 4, Section 7 
(1) HmbTG exempts business and trading secrets insofar and for as long as 
the interest in non-disclosure outweighs the interest in disclosure. It is the 
first legal definition of the term ‘business and trading secret’. Finally, Section 
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9 HmbTG contains some further restrictions of the obligation to inform. For 
example, contracts with an intrinsic value of less than €100,000 do not need 
to be published.
Sections 8 and 10 HmbTG are technical regulations. The authorities have to 
take measures so that exempted data can be separated easily from the rest of 
the information [Section 8 HmbTG]. Section 10 regulates the information reg-
ister and its use and the further use and distribution of the information. This 
includes a special regulation for contracts. All contracts must be concluded 
in such a way that they become effective only one month after having been 
made public, and in such a way that they can be revoked by the authority 
within that period [Section 10 (2) HmbTG].
Sections 11 to 13 HmbTG contain the application procedure for information 
that is not subject to proactive disclosure. Section 11 regulates the request. 
The request should be filed in written form, but an electronic or oral request 
is also possible [Section 11 (1) HmbTG]. The claimant has to name the informa-
tion required [Section 11 (2) sentence 1 HmbTG]. The authority has to counsel 
the claimant [Section 11 (2) sentence 2 HmbTG]. The authorities have to pro-
vide the claimant with the name of the authority which has the information if 
they do not have it themselves [Section 11 (2) sentence 3 HmbTG].
Sections 12 and 13 HmbTG govern the access to information. The authority 
has to give the claimant access to the information or provide the information 
depending on what the claimant is requesting. If exemptions pursuant to Sec-
tion 4 or Section 7 HmbTG hinder the provision of access, the authority has 
to ask the respective third party for its consent in order to provide claimants 
with access to the information requested. With regard to time frames, the ac-
cess to information requested has to be provided within one month but the 
deadline can be prolonged by another month. Equally, the rejection has to be 
made within a month too. The rejection has to be in written form, but an oral 
request can be rejected orally. Finally, costs and fees apply.
Section 14 HmbTG regulates the HmbBfDI, who assumes the role of an om-
budsman. Anyone who believes their rights under the HmbTG have been 
violated can appeal to the HmbBfDI. The HmbBfDI can only counsel and pro-
vide the advice-seeking individual with an informed opinion. In addition, the 
HmbBfDI informs the public about the right to access information and coun-
sels the authorities. Furthermore, if the HmbBfDI identifies deficiencies in the 
way the authorities treat the citizen’s right to access official information, the 
HmbBfDI can ask the authorities to remedy those deficiencies.
Finally, Section 16 HmbTG governs the relation between the HmbTG and 
state treaties. The HmbTG also applies to treaties older than the HmbTG itself 
[Section 17 HmbTG]. Section 18 (2) stipulates that the HmbTG has to be evalu-
ated four years after it entered into force. The Senate (the government of 
Hamburg) has to inform the Bürgerschaft about the results of the evaluation.
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3 Evaluation of the HmbTG
3.1 Objectives of the evaluation
According to the evaluation clause in Section 18 (2) HmbTG, the overall pur-
pose of the evaluation was to assess the law’s implementation and effective-
ness. With regard to the latter, the evaluation team was to check whether 
the objectives stated in Section 1 HmbTG – providing official information to 
the public, supporting democratic will- and opinion-forming processes, and 
enabling the public to monitor government actions – were achieved. Moreo-
ver, the evaluation team had to assess whether the objectives specified in the 
justification of the law (Bürgerschaft der Freien und Hansestadt Hamburg, 
2012, pp. 12f.) were achieved, namely increasing the public’s acceptance of 
administrative action and enhancing trust in government actions.
The second central evaluation task was to provide the client of the evaluation 
with empirically founded insights into the law’s implementation by the public 
authorities bound by the law and into the implementation of the Hamburg 
Transparency Portal, the information register specified in Section 10 HmbTG. 
The evaluation team was expected to uncover implementation problems and 
identify potentials for optimisation. In this context, not only implementation 
processes had to be investigated but also the legal document itself, which 
means that the evaluation team also had to assess whether or not the formu-
lation of the HmbTG supported or hampered the implementation of the law.
In order to comply with the evaluation goals, both the obligation of the public 
authorities to disclose official information proactively and their obligation to 
release government information on request were considered by the evalua-
tion team. Since the HmbTG was the first transparency law in Germany that 
forced authorities to disclose government information proactively, however, 
the evaluation put special emphasis on the implementation and effects of 
this special feature and the infrastructure – namely the Hamburg Transpar-
ency Portal – that was necessary for implementing the proactive disclosure 
of information.
3.2 Methodology
Basically, the evaluation of the HmbTG was conceptualised as an ex-post regu-
latory impact assessment (Böhret & Konzendorf, 2001), which means that the 
evaluation of the legal measure did not start until the regulation had already 
come into force. In the present case, the evaluation started four years after 
the HmbTG had entered into force. It started in July 2016 and was completed 
in July 2017. In conducting the study, the evaluation team availed itself of an 
integrative mixed-methods approach that combined the use of quantitative 
and qualitative methods of empirical research as well as social scientific and 
legal perspectives. Moreover, the team followed a participative approach to 
evaluation (Stockmann, 2008), which means that relevant stakeholders were 
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involved in the evaluation process – for example, in the course of instrument 
development and sampling – in order to exploit their domain-related expert 
knowledge for evaluative purposes. To ensure a study of high quality, the 
evaluation team followed the standards of the German and Austrian Evalua-
tion Association (DeGEval, 2016).
The evaluation of the HmbTG required the collection of empirical data from 
various sources. In cooperation with the Hamburg Ministry of Justice, the 
evaluation team identified four relevant stakeholder groups from which data 
had to be gathered: (1) public authorities bound by the HmbTG who have to 
implement the law; (2) users of the Transparency Portal who are the main tar-
get group of the HmbTG’s obligation to proactive disclosure of information; 
(3) the employees of the city of Hamburg who have to deal with the HmbTG 
in their daily work; (4) members of the advisory board of the former project 
‘Implementation of the Hamburg Transparency Law’ – a committee mainly 
composed of representatives of civil society organisations that was intended 
to accompany and control the implementation of the HmbTG.
In the course of data collection, the evaluation team followed different strat-
egies.
First, all the stakeholder groups mentioned above were subjected to an on-
line survey. Depending on the recipients of the survey, a broad range of infor-
mation was gathered.
The survey of the public authorities bound by the law included various ques-
tions concerning the amount, type, and quality of information published and 
released, about the organisational structures and processes adjusted for im-
plementing the HmbTG, and about the quality, manageability, and effective-
ness of the law. The survey was conducted in two waves in order to collect a 
sufficient amount of information on objective data (i.e., on information pub-
lished and released). The first wave started in October 2016 and aimed to col-
lect objective data for the period from 2012 to September 2016. The second 
wave started in March 2017 and was intended to collect objective data for the 
period from October 2016 to February 2017. In total, 93 authorities partici-
pated in the first wave and 83 in the second. Because the evaluation team was 
not provided with a full list of all authorities bound by the HmbTG, a response 
rate could not be calculated. However, according to the evaluation client the 
response rate was very high.
The users of the Transparency Portal were mainly asked about their user be-
haviour when using the portal and about their perceptions of the effects of 
proactive information disclosure. Because it was not possible to recruit survey 
participants randomly, the evaluation team had to rely on a specific type of 
convenience sample. More specifically, survey participants were recruited via 
flash-layers – a non-intrusive type of pop-up – while surfing on the Transpar-
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ency Portal. The survey was on line from October 2016 to February 2017. In 
total, 412 visitors to the Transparency Portal participated in the survey.
The survey of the employees of the city of Hamburg mainly contained ques-
tions about the law’s practicability and its potential effectiveness. The on-line 
questionnaire was distributed via the joint portal of Hamburg’s administra-
tion. The survey was on line from October 2016 to December 2016. In total, 
896 employees of the city of Hamburg participated.
Finally, the survey of the advisory board also contained questions relating 
to the implementation and effectiveness of the HmbTG. All 17 members of 
the advisory board were requested to participate in the survey from October 
2016 to December 2016. Only five institutions took up the offer, which equals 
a response rate of 29%.
Second, as an accompanying measure, the evaluation team conducted 13 
semi-structured interviews (see list in annex) with experts and representa-
tives from different institutions – namely, from the authorities bound by the 
law, indirect public administration, the above-mentioned advisory board, the 
office of the HmbBfDI, and the Technical Control Center for the Transparency 
Portal. These interviews were primarily used as an instrument to get deeper 
insights into the implementation of the HmbTG and obtain expert assess-
ments about the practicability of the law, its effects, and any revisions that 
might be necessary.
Third, statistical secondary data relating to the Transparency Portal – con-
taining information on the amount, subject, date, and type of information 
published by authorities and on usage patterns (e.g. monthly click numbers; 
search terms; use of help function) from September 2014 to February 2017 – 
were analysed to provide the evaluation client both with a detailed overview 
of the official information proactively published on the portal by the public 
authorities and with an assessment of the level of public demand for govern-
ment information in the city of Hamburg.
Finally, the evaluation team conducted a criteria-led content analysis of the 
Transparency Portal by screening documents published on the portal in order 
to assess whether they met the requirements specified by the HmbTG (exem-
plary criteria: accuracy, completeness, and comprehensibility of information 
provided; access to information provided; timely provision of information; 
etc.) and whether they were prepared in a user-friendly and comprehensible 
way (exemplary criteria: quality of information on the purpose and the site 
operator; quality of presentation of the page contents; provision of exam-
ples; quality/degree of visualisation/graphical presentation; quality of search 
function; provision of a help function; etc.). Half the documents were selected 
based on their relevance, whilst the other half were selected randomly. In to-
tal, 40 documents published on the Transparency Portal were analysed.
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While the evaluation team collected and analysed empirical data, its members 
also conducted a thorough assessment of the legal text of the HmbTG against 
the background of the jurisprudence relating to it, the legal commentary of 
the HmbTG, the internal comments on how to implement the HmbTG devel-
oped by the Hamburg Ministry of Justice, the activity reports of the HmbBfDI, 
and the available articles by legal scholars relating to the HmbTG. The results 
of the legal assessment were combined with the empirical findings in order to 
paint a comprehensive picture of the quality of the HmbTG.
3.3 Results 
The following sections contain selected evaluation findings with regard to 
the effectiveness of the HmbTG, its implementation, and the formulation 
of the law. A complete and detailed overview of the findings – including the 
numbers and statistical data – can be found in Herr et al. (2018b; 2017).
3.3.1	 Effectiveness	of	the	HmbTG
First, assessing the effectiveness of the HmbTG included an analysis of the 
outputs induced by the passing of the law. Typical output indicators of an FOI 
law like the HmbTG are the amount of information that is published proac-
tively, the numbers of FOI requests filed, granted, and refused, and the extent 
of delays of information disclosure. The evaluation of the HmbTG provided 
detailed information on all these outputs and a lot more. For example, it was 
found that about 66,000 data files were published on the Transparency Portal 
from September 2014 to February 2017. Almost two thirds of the data pub-
lished on the Portal referred to the subject areas ‘infrastructure, construction 
and housing’ and ‘politics and elections’, the majority of which were published 
without any delay. With regard to the demand side, the Transparency Portal 
was accessed more than 22.5 million times from April 2015 to February 2017, 
mostly by private citizens. In addition to that, the evaluation found that dur-
ing the period from October 2012 to February 2017, Hamburg’s authorities 
received more than 4,000 requests for accessing official information that had 
not been published on the Transparency Portal. In more than 75% of these 
cases, complete access to the information requested was granted. In contrast 
to that, considerably fewer than 10% of the requests were fully denied. It is 
worth noting that only a small fraction – about 13% – of the requests with 
a positive decision needed more time for processing than is allowed by the 
HmbTG. Finally, in the majority of cases, the authorities charged claimants 
only moderate fees or provided the information requested free of charge.
Second, evaluating the effectiveness of the HmbTG involved an assessment of 
whether or not it was a suitable instrument for achieving the goals specified 
in Section 1 HmbTG. For this purpose, the authorities bound by the HmbTG, 
the employees of the city of Hamburg, and several experts were asked to 
provide assessments in the on-line surveys and expert interviews conducted. 
The results of the evidence collected suggested that the expediency of the 
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HmbTG was assessed ambiguously. Whereas the authorities bound by the law 
and employees of the city of Hamburg were, on average, slightly critical of 
the HmbTG’s expediency for achieving the goals stated in Section 1 HmbTG, 
the advisory board and several of the experts interviewed were rather more 
positive on this issue. More specifically, 73.6% of the authorities bound by the 
HmbTG and 71.8% of Hamburg’s employees believed that the HmbTG did not 
fulfil its purpose or only partially fulfilled it. Further, in a follow-up correla-
tional analysis, it was found that the degree of expediency as assessed by the 
bound authorities and Hamburg’s employees was positively associated with 
their assessments of the manageability (authorities: r = .42, p < .01; employ-
ees: r =.54, p < .001) and comprehensibility of the HmbTG (authorities: r = .29, 
p < .05; employees: r = .40, p < .001). This means that the perceived expediency 
of the law at least partially depends on aspects of its formulation and wording.
Finally, determining the effectiveness of the HmbTG included assessments 
by different stakeholder groups as to whether the HmbTG had impacts on 
a variety of specific aspects. In this context, a majority of the users of the 
Transparency Portal believed that the disclosure of government informa-
tion increases trust in government actions (66.3%), opportunities for political 
participation (78.0%), and opportunities for monitoring government actions 
(55.3%). With regard to the latter, however, this was assessed differently by 
the majority of the Hamburg employees surveyed who – on average – did not 
see an increased potential for public monitoring of government actions. More 
specifically, only 32.6% of the employees believed that the HmbTG increases 
the opportunities to monitor government actions. In addition to that, the 
majority of the employees (72.6%) were negative about whether or not the 
introduction of the HmbTG led to increased cost awareness within the public 
authorities bound by the law.
3.3.2 Implementation of the HmbTG
The effective implementation of an FOI act is an important prerequisite for its 
impacts because “without effective implementation, an access to information 
law – however well drafted – will fail to meet the public policy objectives of 
transparency” (Neuman and Calland, 2007, p. 182). Consequently, analysing 
the implementation of the HmbTG had to be an essential part of the evalu-
ation. Due to the vast amount of data collected, however, the results of the 
implementation analysis cannot be presented in full detail here. Instead, the 
following paragraphs provide a brief overview of selected findings.
Basically, one can distinguish between two areas of implementation of the 
HmbTG, namely the implementation that takes place within the authorities 
bound by the law and the implementation that takes place outside those 
authorities. Both areas were considered by the evaluation team. First, with 
regard to the law’s implementation within the bound authorities, the evalu-
ation team put some emphasis on changes in organisational structures and 
processes. In this context, it was found that the authorities bound by the law 
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introduced diverse types of organisational structural change – for example, 
new positions within authorities managing the proactive disclosure of infor-
mation and handling the processing of incoming requests were created or 
specific responsibilities assigned – in order to respond to the requirements 
made by the HmbTG. Furthermore, the evaluation team observed the intro-
duction and adjustment of processes and workflows in respect of reviewing, 
recording, and monitoring incoming requests and the data which have to be 
published. The evaluation team also found that the authorities established 
new and adjusted existing processes of quality management, data protec-
tion, and complaint management, and they observed that specific routines 
for handling exceptions and preparing the information for publication were 
developed. At the end of the day, only a small fraction of authorities stated 
that they did not make any adjustments in response to the introduction of the 
HmbTG. In this context, an important finding was that there was no generalis-
able ‘best practice’ in respect of how authorities responded to the introduc-
tion of the HmbTG in terms of organisational and procedural adaptation. On 
the contrary, it became clear that the strategies for implementing the law 
varied considerably, depending on a number of factors such as the nature, 
size, and administrative culture of the individual authorities.
Second, with regard to the implementation of the HmbTG outside the authori-
ties bound by the law, the evaluation team mainly investigated aspects relat-
ing to the technical infrastructure required for implementing the obligation to 
proactive disclosure, namely the Hamburg Transparency Portal. It goes with-
out saying that the functionality of such an information register depends on 
the technical implementation of the portal and the quality of the workflows 
employed by the authorities to make their data available on the portal. While 
the technical implementation was considered to be good by the majority of 
the authorities, many of them reported minor problems with the developed 
workflows. However, almost two thirds of the authorities stated that technical 
problems with the workflows are usually solved in a very timely manner, which 
guarantees the functionality of the portal. This brings us to an important as-
pect, namely the existence of a sufficiently well staffed and experienced tech-
nical support unit. And indeed, the work and advice provided by the respon-
sible support unit in Hamburg was assessed as very important and helpful by 
the authorities. Moreover, the effectiveness of the portal depends not only 
on technical aspects but also on its clarity and usability and the preparation 
and comprehensibility of the information published on the portal. Neither the 
clarity nor the usability were rated as negative or positive by several groups of 
stakeholders (e.g., the surveyed users of the portal and the employees of the 
city of Hamburg). One of the main reasons for these mediocre assessments is 
the search engine embedded on the portal, which still has to be improved. A 
correlational analysis showed that the better the search engine was rated, the 
more positive the assessments of the clarity (r = .64; p < .001) and usability of 
the portal as a whole (r = .72; p < .001), and the greater the satisfaction of the 
users with the time needed to find the information being sought (r = .59; p < 
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.001). Yet if the information being sought is eventually found by the searchers, 
it fulfils its purpose in most of the cases. The users of the Transparency Por-
tal – and some representatives from other stakeholder groups in the expert 
interviews – stated that the information obtained on the portal was mostly 
comprehensible, complete, and useful. 65.3% of the portal users surveyed 
stated that the information obtained met their information needs (in contrast 
to 7.1% who claimed that it did not meet their needs), 69% had the impres-
sion that the information was complete (in contrast to 12.1% who considered 
it incomplete), and 79.3% found that the information was comprehensible (in 
contrast to fewer than 3% who found it not to be comprehensible).
Finally, the evaluation team collected data on whether existing advisory ser-
vices and support measures provided by the Hamburg Ministry of Justice, the 
HmbBfDI, and other actors played an important role in implementing the law. 
In this context, the authorities bound by the HmbTG mainly referred to the 
internal comments of the Ministry of Justice that were indispensable for han-
dling the law in everyday practice. Similarly, the authorities stated that it was 
important to have their employees trained for working with the HmbTG by 
qualified training institutions. On the contrary, the advisory services of the 
HmbBfDI were only rarely used by the authorities, although the existence of 
such an offer was considered to be important.
3.3.3 Formulation of the HmbTG
The effectiveness of a transparency law depends not only on its implementa-
tion, but also on its formulation. The more comprehensible a transparency law 
is to those bodies that have to work with it, the higher the degree of manage-
ability and as a consequence, the easier its implementation. Because of these 
relationships, the evaluation team took a close look into the formulation of 
the HmbTG. From an empirical perspective, this mainly meant that those who 
deal with the law in everyday practice were asked whether the HmbTG is com-
prehensible and manageable in practice. With regard to comprehensibility, 
representatives of the authorities bound by the law and employees of the 
city of Hamburg who had to deal with the HmbTG in their daily work rated its 
comprehensibility to be only average. More specifically, more than 80% of the 
authorities and employees surveyed did not rate the comprehensibility of the 
HmbTG as good or very good. Therefore, it is not surprising that the manage-
ability of the law was also rated as mediocre. Here too, more than 80% of the 
authorities and employees surveyed did not believe that the manageability of 
the HmbTG was good or very good.
Besides these rather general aspects, the legal analysis showed that the Hmb-
TG poses several specific legal problems. The most complicated problem re-
volves around indirect public administration and its mention in Section 2 (3) 
and (5) HmbTG. The German administrative doctrine refers to ‘indirect public 
administration’ if the state creates a legal entity under administrative law to 
fulfil its duties. Those legal entities are not to be confused with legal entities 
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under civil law. According to Section 2 (3) sentence 1 HmbTG, an authority is 
what Section 1 (2) of the Hamburg Administrative Procedure Act defines as 
an authority. Section 1 (2) of the Hamburg Administrative Procedure Act says 
that any entity which performs tasks of the public administration is an au-
thority. This is the functional definition of ‘authority’ (Maatsch and Schnabel, 
2015, p. 141). This definition includes direct as well as indirect public admin-
istration (Maatsch and Schnabel, 2015, p. 141). Unfortunately, Section 2 (5) 
HmbTG refers to the authorities pursuant to Section 2 (3) HmbTG and indirect 
public administration separately, which raises a question: does indirect pub-
lic administration fall under the obligation to proactive disclosure or not? A 
lengthy discussion among legal scholars followed. Some believe that indirect 
public administration is under the obligation to proactive disclosure, whilst 
others claim that it is not. The HmbTG has its own definition of authority. The 
latter group has to answer a second question: if indirect public administration 
does not fall under the obligation to proactive disclosure found in Section 2 
(3) HmbTG, does it fall under the obligation to publish as stated in Section 
3 (2) HmbTG? Some deny this because Section 3 (2) only relates to Section 
3 (1) HmbTG. After the evaluation had been completed, both the Adminis-
trative Court Hamburg and the Hamburg Higher Administrative Court subse-
quently and unanimously ruled that the indirect public administration does 
not fall under the obligation to proactive disclosure (VG Hamburg, Urteil vom 
18.9.2017 – 17 K 273/15 and Hamburgisches OVG, Beschluss vom 16.4.2018 – 
3 Bf 271/17.Z). Personally, we believe that indirect public administration does 
fall under the obligation to proactive disclosure. The wording of both Section 
2 (3) and (5) HmbTG is of no help. Although they are both easy to understand 
and clear, they contradict each other. The definition of ‘authority’ under Ger-
man administrative law is the same in the Federation and the Länder. It is fairly 
old and has so far proved to be a clear, easily understandable, working defini-
tion. Given that good regulation is clear and easy to understand, it seems very 
unwise to change this in favour of a second term for ‘authority’ which only ap-
plies to one single law. A law which requires the direct administration entities 
controlled by the state to publish information but does not apply the same re-
quirement to the indirect administration entities is unsystematic. Moreover, it 
was the intention of the people’s initiative to have the whole administration 
fall under the obligation to proactive disclosure. Therefore, in order to solve 
the problem, we recommend a revision of Section 2 HmbTG.
Another important legal problem is found in Section 3 HmbTG: many of the 
law’s terms and definitions are unclear. For example, Section 3 (1) No. 1 pro-
vides for publication of the petitions of the decisions of the Senate. While 
petitions exist, they are not part of the decisions. Moreover, according to Sec-
tion 3 (1) No. 8 HmbTG, reports and studies which were commissioned by an 
authority, affected the authority’s decision, or served the purpose of prepar-
ing a decision, have to be published. It is unclear under which conditions a 
report or study is ‘commissioned’ by an authority. It is equally unclear whether 
the reports and studies have to be commissioned and used or if the use of a 
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study by a third party is enough to warrant publication. Another example can 
be found in Section 3 (1) No. 15 HmbTG, which provides for publication of the 
salaries of the CEOs of the businesses under the control of the city of Ham-
burg. Yet it is conceivable that the legislative power for regulating this subject 
is held not by the city of Hamburg but by the Federation. Furthermore, this 
may or may not impair the CEO’s right to informational self-determination.
Another legal problem has to do with Section 4 (1) sentence 1 HmbTG, which 
concerns the obliteration of all personal data. The obliteration of all personal 
data sounds easy in theory, but it is complicated in practice because it does 
not provide for an exemption for ministers. The purpose of Section 4 (1) sen-
tence 1 HmbTG is that the author of a published document is unrecognisable. 
This extends to the names of ministers since there is no exception for them. 
It is, however, easy to find out who held which post in which government. An 
obliteration of the minister’s name is not enough to obliterate the author. 
Even the name of the ministry, the date, and the content of the document 
may provide hints on who the author is. As a consequence the document can-
not be published. Personally, we recommend a revision of Section 4 (1) sen-
tence 1 HmbTG.
Finally, Section 10 (2) HmbTG, which regulates the possibility to revoke a con-
tract, is unique in German law. Unfortunately, it is not problem-free. Dogmati-
cally, it is unclear where it fits in to German civil law which provides the leges 
generale for the revoking of contracts. Only the Federation has the legislative 
capacity to change civil law. Additionally, the Civil Code prohibits a right to 
withdrawal written in standard terms and conditions if the withdrawal is un-
conditional. Section 10 (2) HmbTG does not provide for any conditions for the 
withdrawal. It is unclear whether or not this violates the Civil Code.
4 Discussion
Taken together, the evaluation findings suggest that the intended goals of 
the HmbTG were widely achieved. Particularly with regard to the outputs, the 
findings show that one of the main goals of the law – namely, providing the 
public with free and direct access to government information – was largely 
met. We believe that this is true despite the fact that no target attainment 
criteria were specified prior to the evaluation, which would have made it eas-
ier to assess whether goals were achieved or not. Further, since the results 
acquired by the output analysis are based on objective secondary data, they 
can be considered as quite reliable. In contrast to that, the findings with re-
gard to the expediency and the impacts of the law are less reliable for two 
reasons. First, there were no baseline, time-series, or control group data avail-
able (see Mueller 2018), which is why the evaluation team had to rely exclu-
sively on stakeholders’ perceptions and subjective assessments of potential 
outcomes. Although these ratings provide valuable hints about whether or 
not the HmbTG is effective in changing various aspects – such as increasing 
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the acceptance of administrative action, trust in government actions, the op-
portunities for political participation, and the opportunities for monitoring 
government actions – the findings should not be interpreted as causal effects 
of the law. Second, the expediency of the HmbTG and the impacts as per-
ceived by different groups of stakeholders were rated ambiguously. Whereas 
some stakeholder groups saw neither a high expediency nor any positive out-
comes of the HmbTG, others were confident that the commencement of the 
law has led to positive changes regarding several aspects. As stated by Herr et 
al. (2018b), these ambiguous perceptions are presumably caused by different 
viewpoints between those required to implement the law and deal with it in 
everyday practice and those who benefit from the law by gaining access to of-
ficial information. Hence, it is concluded that it is likely that the HmbTG has at 
least had some positive effects on its intended target groups, but that future 
research should further investigate its causal effects.
When it comes to the implementation of the law, the evaluation findings pro-
vide practitioners with several important implications. First of all, it became 
clear that there is no best way of implementing the law, but that any authority 
bound by the HmbTG should find its own individual strategy for implementa-
tion. Second, the evaluation showed that the introduction of the law did not 
lead to a cost explosion as expected by some of its critics. This is an impor-
tant message to all those countries or federal states that still do not have a 
transparency law containing an obligation to proactive disclosure. Third, the 
findings also clearly showed that accompanying measures – such as detailed 
comments about how the law is applied and training and consulting measures 
– are indispensable in order to support the authorities by implementing the 
law. Consequently, such measures should be developed even before the law 
enters into force so that they can provide authorities with the necessary sup-
port right from the beginning of the implementation process. Moreover, it 
has become clear that developing a working technical infrastructure – includ-
ing the existence of a sufficiently well equipped and experienced technical 
support unit – is indispensable for guaranteeing the smooth execution of the 
obligation to proactive information disclosure.
Finally, the evaluation findings suggest that the quality of the formulation 
of the HmbTG should be improved in future revisions because the compre-
hensibility of the law determines its manageability for practitioners, which 
in turn affects its effectiveness in respect of producing outputs and inducing 
impacts. Hints on how the HmbTG might be revised are provided by the re-
sults of the legal analysis of the HmbTG (Herr et al., 2018b) and by more than 
50 specific recommendations made by the authorities bound by the HmbTG 
(Herr et al., 2018b, pp. 340-350). Recommendations are, for example, to re-
strict the amount of information that has to be published, to specify and con-
cretise legal terms and definitions, to revise the regulations concerning the 
charging of fees, and to introduce instruments for sanctioning if authorities 
do not comply with the legal requirements.
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5 Conclusion
This article was devoted to presenting the background and results of the evalu-
ation of the HmbTG, Germany’s first FOI law that forced public authorities to 
disclose government information proactively. The evaluation findings showed 
that the introduction of a transparency law can lead to advantages as well as dis-
advantages in various stakeholder groups. In general, however, the evaluation 
team concluded that the advantages which have accompanied the introduction 
of the law outweigh the disadvantages. Because of this overall conclusion, in-
troducing transparency laws forcing public authorities to publish government 
information proactively and release information on request seems to be a rea-
sonable approach for increasing the level of transparency in Germany.
The present article also showed how valuable a comprehensive FOI law evalu-
ation can be. Besides the fact that it contributes to the scientific literature by 
providing researchers with unique insights into the effectiveness and func-
tionality of a transparency law, it also provides the legislative power with use-
ful information for revising the law and practitioners with valuable informa-
tion about how to deal with the law in everyday practice.
In order to ensure the quality of future FOI law evaluations, they require their 
clients to make various types of preparation. First, when commissioning an 
evaluation, one should be clear about the goals pursued by it (e.g., assessing 
the effectiveness or implementation of an FOI law) and communicate these 
to the evaluators in a clear manner. Second, evaluation clients should provide 
evaluators with sufficient data, particularly when it comes to causal impact 
assessment, because this evaluation task depends crucially on the availability 
of certain types of data (e.g., longitudinal or control group data). Thus, it is 
reasonable for public authorities to start collecting data even before an FOI 
law comes into force and to continue with data collection until the evaluation 
starts. Third, since the evaluation of FOI laws takes time and involves costs, 
evaluation clients should provide sufficient temporal and monetary resources 
so that evaluators can conduct the evaluation appropriately. This is particular-
ly important for estimating the causal impacts of an FOI law, which often con-
sumes more resources than other evaluation tasks (e.g., White, 2006). Fourth, 
evaluation clients should provide FOI law evaluators with organisational as-
sistance, for example by giving them access to the relevant information car-
riers (e.g., public authorities which are responsible for implementing an FOI 
law, lawmakers, or civil society actors). Finally, it seems reasonable for clients 
to ensure the publication of evaluation reports. This is not only relevant for 
various kinds of actor in order to learn from the evaluation and work with the 
evaluation results, but also enables researchers to summarise the results of 
FOI law evaluations and provides the basis for ‘meta-evaluations’, studies that 
“check evaluations for problems such as bias, technical error, administrative 
difficulties, and misuse” (Stufflebeam, 2010, p. 99).
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Annex: List of interview partners
Authorities bound by the HmbTG:
Senatskanzlei Hamburg (Hamburg Senate Chancellery)
Behörde für Umwelt und Energie Hamburg (Hamburg Ministry for the En-
vironment and Energy)
Behörde für Stadtentwicklung und Wohnen Hamburg (Hamburg Ministry 
of Urban Development and Housing)
Finanzbehörde Hamburg (Hamburg Ministry of Finance)
Bezirksamt Hamburg-Mitte (District Office Hamburg-Mitte)
Indirect public administration:
Handelskammer Hamburg (Hamburg Chamber of Commerce)
Hamburg Port Authority
Businesses bound by the HmbTG:
Gebäudemanagement Hamburg GmbH
Hafencity Hamburg GmbH
Members of the advisory board of the former project “Implementation of 
the Hamburg Transparency Law”:
Chaos Computer Club Hamburg
Transparency International Hamburg
Hamburgischer Beauftragter für Datenschutz und Informationsfreiheit 
(Hamburg Commissioner for Data Protection and Freedom of Information)
Fachliche Leitstelle Transparenzportal (Technical Control Center for the 
Transparency Portal)
